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ABSTRACT 
We plan to simulate a private and unlinkable exchange of 
messages by using a Public bulletin board and Mix 
networks in Opportunistic networks. This Opportunistic 
network uses a secure and privacy-friendly asynchronous 
unidirectional message transmission protocol. By using this 
protocol, we create a Public bulletin board in a network that 
makes individuals send or receive events unlinkable to one 
another [18]. With the design of a Public bulletin board in 
an Opportunistic network, the clients can use the benefits of 
this Public bulletin board in a safe environment. When this 
Opportunistic network uses the protocol, it can guarantee an 
unlinkable communication based on the Mix networks. The 
protocol can work with the Public bulletin board 
exclusively with acceptable performance. Also, this 
simulation can be used for hiding metadata in the 
bidirectional message exchange in some messengers such 
as WhatsApp. As we know, one of the main goals of a 
messenger like WhatsApp is to protect the social graph. By 
using this protocol, a messenger can protect social graph 
and a central Public bulletin board. 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1 General Objective 
We plan to simulate a private and unlinkable exchange of 
messages by using a Public bulletin board and Mix 
networks in Opportunistic networks. To do this, we have 
designed an Opportunistic network that uses a secure and 
private integrated protocol. We can use this project in mail 
providers or messengers. In our proposal, clients can send 
their messages in a safe and secure environment. Users can 
use the advantage of a public bulletins board and save their 
messages in a database securely. Two nodes allow for 
communication in an Opportunistic network so that data 
transference takes place by using Mix networks and Public 
bulletin boards in a way that the contact address is not 
revealed to the participants in the communication [18].  
By using Mixer nodes in our proposal, we can make a non-
tracing Opportunistic network, and a client can send and 
receive a message anonymously. In this Opportunistic 
network, malicious users cannot rebuild social structure 
networks. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In other words, with the simulation of this proposal, we 
designed indirect and non-tracing communication. In a 
nutshell, we can say that our primary goal of simulation of 
this proposal is creating Opportunistic networks by using 
Public bulletin boards and Mix networks in a non-tracing 
space. 
1.2 Document Structure 
This document consists of the Abstract and Introduction 
sections and the Related works section. The Related works 
section includes three main subsections: Definition of 
Opportunistic networks, Anonymity in Opportunistic 
networks and Mix networks. 
In the first subsection, the document offers a definition for 
Opportunistic networks and discusses five routing methods 
in Opportunistic networks as well as the Architecture of 
Opportunistic networks. This section tries to familiarize the 
reader with the basic concepts of Opportunistic networks. 
In Anonymity in Opportunistic networks section have two 
subsections. In the first part, the documents introduced a 
definition of anonymity in the opportunistic network. Also, 
this part tries to familiarization the readers with some basic 
concept of Anonymity in Opportunistic networks. In the 
second subsection the document introducing some 
anonymous routing protocols and explain all of them 
briefly. 
The third subsection explains about Mix networks. Mix 
networks subsection has three parts that including a 
definition of Mix networks, the description of mixer nodes 
and privacy issues in Mix networks. Since our simulation 
model has used Mix networks, this document needs to 
explain the structure and general concepts of Mix networks. 
In this subsection, we review Mix networks and explain 
about the node's behaviour in them. The section illustrates 
how Mix networks can create paths by using mixer nodes. 
This subsection also discusses privacy issues in Mix 
network. Furthermore, we offer some suggestion for 
improving privacy in Mix networks in the end.  
The fourth section is the Proposal section. It includes two 
main subsections. The first one discusses the structure of 
Public bulletin boards and their advantages. It offers a 
detailed explanation of different parts of the Public bulletin 
board structure. We clarify that a Public bulletin board can 
have that include Write method, Read method and response 
method. The second subsection of the proposal discusses 
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client protocol for the transmission of packets between 
nodes and a Public bulletin board by Mix networks.  
The fifth section of the document is the Experimentation 
section. It includes four subsections. The first subsection 
describes the simulation environment. In general, in this 
subsection, we talk about the ONE simulator and describe 
the differences between java functions in the ONE 
simulator. The next subsection is Scenario in which we 
explain about two scenarios run in our simulation. Also, we 
discuss the differences and similarities of those scenarios. 
The next subsection is the ONE modification in which we 
explain all the changes that we made on some functions of 
the ONE simulator. At the end of Experimentation section, 
we review the results of both scenarios and discuss all the 
metrics we have used. Next, we compare both scenarios and 
present a conclusion on the results. 
The final two sections of the document are the conclusion 
of the whole document and the bibliography. 
 
2. RELATED WORK 
2.1 Opportunistic networks 
2.1.1 Definition and characteristics 
One subclass of the Delay-Tolerant Networks is 
Opportunistic networks. An Opportunistic network has 
intermittent communication opportunities in a way that 
there ever exists an end-to-end path between the sources 
and the destinations. In an Opportunistic network, link 
performance is too variable. We cannot use TCP/IP 
protocol in an Opportunistic network, because of an end-to-
end path created between the source and the destination for 
a short period of time and its unpredictability. An 
Opportunistic network can use node mobility to exploits 
and local forwarding for data transference, which can be an 
excellent suggestion to forfeit the lack of TCP/IP protocols 
[1]. Each node can store and carry data until these nodes 
have opportunistic contact. The nodes can forward the data 
when they have opportunistic contact with other nodes. In 
general, entire messages transferred from a node's buffer to 
another node's buffer until the messages reach their 
destination by using a path. 
In general, we can mention three main characteristics of 
Opportunistic networks. These characteristics include 
flexibility for different environments, low budget and easy 
implementation. These characteristics help us develop 
Opportunistic networks quickly. In what follows, we 
explain each characteristic in more details. 
The first characteristic of Opportunistic networks is their 
flexibility. Opportunistic networks can include a large 
number of nodes that are always on the move. The 
movement of nodes can be used to convey messages. 
 
Figure 1. An example of an Opportunistic network. Adapted 
from [4] 
 
The nodes can share their messages with their neighbour 
nodes. Since nodes are moving, they can transfer the 
messages from one node to other groups of nodes until the 
messages arrive at the destination node. The movement of 
nodes eliminates the need to install the specific 
infrastructure for transmission of messages in Opportunistic 
networks. Network designer can design different protocols 
on movement devices easily, and these protocols can 
smoothly  adapt to the needs of different environments in 
order to convey messages. Advantages of using these 
networks include their utilizing a variety of protocols, high 
versatility with different environments and their use of the 
movement of nodes for transmission which Opportunistic 
networks highly flexible. 
Therefore, we do not need to spend much money to install 
specific infrastructures. For this reason, we can implement 
Opportunistic networks without any government funding 
most of the time. To do so, we only need to use some cheap 
or free applications on local devices which are capable of 
sending and receiving messages in one area. Due to the 
affordability of Opportunistic networks, using them in poor 
or remote areas has been welcomed. 
The last characteristic of Opportunistic networks is related 
to their easy implementation. Network designer needs to 
define some protocols and some programming in the form 
of an application, after that, this application will be installed 
on the local devices in one area. Thus, this process can be 
done in a short time. We can imagine an area which has lost 
all of the network infrastructures by flooding or war and 
this area needs implementation of a network in a short 
period of time. Obviously, in such situations, one of the 
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most reasonable choices are Opportunistic networks 
because of their quick implementation. 
2.1.2 Two Examples of Opportunistic network 
In Figure 1, a simple example of the operation of an 
Opportunistic network is displayed. In this figure, we can 
see different nodes of people and vehicles. These nodes 
include peoples, cars and satellites that form networks 
based on the different infrastructures on earth and sky. 
Some nodes use wired communication to form the 
networks; for instance, these nodes connect to a central 
telephone office with wired connections. Also, we can see 
that some nodes create networks by using a wireless 
connection. We also see that some sensors or some nodes 
have established networks based on internet routing. This 
figure well shows a tolerant network based on a set of 
heterogeneous networks. In this figure, all subset networks 
eventually connect into DTN nodes. A DTN node is a node 
which has the potential to tolerate the delay in message 
transmission paths. 
As shown in Figure 2, this Opportunistic network consists 
of three groups (A, B, and C) of nodes located in separate 
locations. Each group consists of two types of node. The 
first type of node merely consists of group members and 
plays a role in transmitting messages inside their location. 
These normal nodes cannot transfer the messages to the 
outside, but these nodes can transfer ordinary messages 
between members. Other types of nodes are intermediate 
nodes which can send obfuscated messages between 
different groups of nodes in different locations [3].  
As shown in this figure, the node U1 generates the message 
and sends it to the node U2, which is an intermediate node. 
Node U2 transfers the message from the group location A 
to the group location B. Node U2 moves to the group 
location B, and then node U2 publishes the messages 
among the second-nodal group members. After being 
published, the message arrives at the node U4, which is an 
intermediate node. Node U4 moves to the next location and 
publishes the message to the group C. After the message 
reaches U5, we have established a perfect connection 
between the nodes in different places. Now, the node U1 
can send the message through the intermediate nodes to the 
node U5. The node U5 can send the message through 
antenna and route through the various routers to a service 
provider centre. Thus, this figure shows an implementation 
that a node that can by using intermediate nodes in different 
locations send a message to a long-distance service 
provider. 
Figure 2 shows that we can make a path between two long-
distance nodes. Moreover, due to the heterogeneity of the 
path, the Opportunistic network may be associated with 
many disturbances. Some disturbances may cause the 
Opportunistic network to fail the message along the 
transferring path.  
 
Figure 2. An example of an Opportunistic network in real life. 
Adapted from [5] 
 
Network designers need to plan nodes to solve such kinds 
of problems in different situations. It illustrates a condition 
in which the node may not have enough space to buffer a 
message. This node may not have enough space to buffer a 
message. Therefore, we propose that buffers be shared 
between neighbouring nodes. In this case, if a node 
encounters a space shortage, it can use the neighbouring 
node buffers. This suggestion can be an example of network 
flexibility in node planning to solve problems. 
2.1.3 Classification of routing in Opportunistic networks 
We can classify routing algorithms based on the data 
forwarding behaviour in the Opportunistic networks in five 
main categories. These categories include Direct 
Transmission, Flooding Based, Prediction Based, Coding 
Based, and Context-based routing [2]. 
 
A. Direct Transmission 
In this algorithm of routing, each node generates a packet 
for sending to the destination. To do so, they store the in 
their buffer at first. The packets remain in the buffers until 
the nodes meet up the node destination. 
The nodes can forward the message directly to their desired 
destination, and they just forward a single copy of the 
message. Therefore, nodes must wait for an opportunity to 
meet their desired destination and then send their message 
directly. The disadvantage of this method is that it is 
unclear when a sender and receiver can meet each other; 
thus, this routing algorithm has an unbounded delivery 
delay. This algorithm has an advantage since it needs one 
transmission to forward a single copy of the packets. 
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B. Flooding Based routing 
In Flooding Based algorithm of routing, the nodes generate 
a multi-copy of packets and inject them to the Opportunistic 
network. This process continues until the packets arrive at 
the destination — flooding at source nodes classified into 
two categories, which includes controlled and uncontrolled 
categories. In the controlled category, replication of the 
packets is unlimited to reduce the long delivery delay. In 
the controlled category, the opportunistic networks set a 
limit for replication of the packets to reduce the network 
contention. 
 
C. Prediction Based routing 
It should be noted that the Flooding Based routing 
sometimes receives the amount of traffic overhead, and 
Prediction Based algorithm introduces a way to reduce the 
traffic. In Prediction Based algorithm, the Opportunistic 
network predicts and calculates the nodes’ behaviour 
according to their contact history, and the Opportunistic 
network can decide to predict the best probabilistic routing. 
If a neighbour node has higher delivery predictability value, 
a sender node forwards its packet to this node. 
 
D. Coding Based routing 
In Coding Based algorithm of routing, the Opportunistic 
network changes the format of all the packets before 
transmission. Coding based routing embeds additional 
information in blocks of the packets. If the receivers want 
to reconstruct the original packets, they must open a certain 
number of blocks successfully. 
 
E. Context based routing 
The Context-Based algorithm of routing tries to improve 
the Prediction based algorithm by utilizing the context 
information. Sometimes, Prediction Based algorithm fails to 
predict the right paths; thus, the Opportunistic network uses 
the context information that can refine the wrong prediction 
and improve the delivery ratio. 
2.1.4 Architecture of opportunistic networks 
It is important to know than an Opportunistic network 
typically includes separate partitions. These partitions are 
called regions. By using devices in different regions, 
Opportunistic networks try to store-carry-forward the 
packet and make connections between heterogeneous 
regions.  By using a bundle layer, the intermediate nodes 
implement the store-carry forward message switching 
mechanism. The act of nodes is defined by the bundle layer. 
It should be noted that that nodes can perform three acts, as 
a host, a router and a gateway. The bundle layer of the 
router can store, carry and forward the packets between 
nodes in the same region. The bundle layer of the gateway 
can store, carry and forward the packets between different 
regions. The gateway can also be a host, optionally [3]. 
2.2 Anonymity in Opportunistic networks 
2.2.1 Introduction to Anonymous communication 
The purpose of anonymous communication is to 
communicate between senders and receivers who know 
each other, while observers and network entities do not 
recognize the identities of the senders and receivers [6]. 
Malicious users cannot trace the traffics, nor can they 
discover the identities of the sender and receiver. 
As this document discussed, the Opportunistic networks can 
be used in mobile communications, network 
communications in remote areas, intelligent transportation 
and many other types. However, in each different 
implementation of Opportunistic networks, we must always 
protect the privacy. The information potential of each node 
can be a threat and cause serious security problems. We 
should find a way to protect the information and prevent 
from tracing it by dangerous people who can cause 
irreparable problems. One of the best ways to protect the 
nodes’ privacy is to keep their anonymity. Therefore, 
discussing the anonymity of nodes and protecting personal 
information is always a severe challenge in Opportunistic 
networks. 
Opportunistic networks must strive to preserve critical 
information, including names, messages, places and other 
types of information. The formation of social graphs and 
social relationships that are created by the nodes meeting 
must be preserved. The anonymity of the spheres on the 
Opportunistic network guarantees that it can prevent from 
the restructuring of social graphs from malicious users [7]. 
Keeping the node's anonymity by the Opportunistic 
networks does not mean that any of the node's information 
cannot be shared because in many cases, they should also 
share some of the node's information with other nodes. 
Then Opportunistic networks should be able to balance 
between the disclosure of the node's identity and the 
necessary information. The Opportunistic network must try 
to prevent malicious users that try to use confidential 
information. For this purpose, an Opportunistic network 
needs an integration mechanism to protect privacy. An 
Opportunistic network needs an integrated security 
mechanism across the entire network environment, and the 
network must increase the level of trust between nodes. 
With an integrated security system, the network can better 
preserve the social graph. 
An Opportunistic network can do two general possibilities 
for authentication. Before the Opportunistic network 
publishes all identifying information of nodes, there is no 
social graph. The first possibility is to allow the nodes to 
place all of their identity information on the Opportunistic 
network. In this case, the Opportunistic network is very 
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vulnerable. Therefore it must consider a policy among the 
nodes that the network can protect the form of the social 
graph and keep important information at the same time. If 
an Opportunistic network publishes all the information 
about all nodes, creating a social graph is meaningless. 
Another possibility is that the network hides all the nodes’ 
information. Moreover, this policy cannot be realistic. It 
does not allow for the formation of social graphs, and this 
network cannot be very efficient [9].  
This paragraph suggests implementing an integrated 
security mechanism. One of the solutions for authentication 
with anonymity is the use of digital signatures on packets. 
The use of a unique signature in the router enables the 
Opportunistic network to identify identities from packets 
and send messages in a more efficient way. Also, the 
network can better use resources. Also, after the security 
authorization was granted by routers, the routers add 
individual licenses to the packets. All this requires 
additional computing on the Opportunistic network; 
instead, it makes for integrated security on the network 
[8,11]. 
2.2.2 Introducing some anonymous routing protocols 
A. Onion routing 
One famous DTN routing protocol for anonymity is onion 
routing. Onion routing with layered encryption on packets 
by using different secret keys preserves anonymity. The 
peeling off of each layer in DTNs is done by the 
corresponding secret key. This protocol remains the 
anonymous connection between the sender, receivers and 
the final destination, so the connection between them 
becomes untraceable [10]. The paths in onion routing are 
made by some onion routers. Each onion router only 
recognizes the previous and the next router, and none of 
them knows the first sender and the final destination. 
 
B. ALAR  
ALAR is an anonymity protocol for improving level 
privacy by combining the ideas of on-demand routing, 
identity-free routing, and neighbourhood traffic. The main 
idea of ALAR is to fragment a message to K segment and 
to send each segment to at least N neighbours [12]. In 
ALAR protocol, the malicious user receives many copies of 
a packet from different routers at a different time so that if 
they want to trace the packets of the traffic probably cannot 
find the sender and receivers. 
 
C.MASK  
MASK is an anonymous on-demand protocol. 
Neighbouring nodes share a pairwise secret key between 
each other to establish a neighbourhood authentication 
without revealing their identities. With node's secret key, 
MASK can forward and route packets without disclosing of 
identities of nodes [12]. However, we should know that 
malicious users can localize the sender's position, which is a 
weakness. 
 
D. ASR 
ASR is a secure routing protocol that only encrypts a small 
piece of a packet instead of encrypting the whole packet. 
ASR only encrypts a small part of a packet which contains 
the information on the identity of the sender and the 
receiver. It should also be noted that each relay node only 
verifies that small encrypted piece of a packet. The 
forwarding process functions by sharing a key between any 
two consecutive nodes until the message arrives at the 
destination [12]. 
 
E. Privhab 
Privhab uses homomorphic encryption with a protocol that 
functions according to the location of the nodes 
(Homomorphic encryption can encrypt data with additional 
evaluation capability, and Homomorphic encryption can 
use that additional evaluation value for computing over 
encrypted data without using the secret key). This method 
seeks nodes that are within the boundary range and use 
them to select the probability of intermediate nodes. Also, 
this method uses long-term predictions to select the 
intermediate nodes, which increases network efficiency. 
Privhab uses an innovative way to protect privacy. Instead 
of using the actual user name, this method uses aliases to 
keep the identities of the nodes intact [13]. 
 
F. Eprivo 
Eprivo uses Homomorphic encryption for keeping privacy 
and anonymization. The Homomorphic encryption had used 
for avoiding reveals information corresponding to the 
node’s neighbouring graph in Eprivo. When two nodes 
meet each other, they do not share their routing metrics. 
They only compare routing metrics by using Homomorphic 
encryption. The Eprivo have defined two main methods to 
keep anonymous of the nodes. These two methods include 
Neighborhood-randomization and Binary-anonymization 
[14]. 
2.3 Mix networks 
2.3.1 Defination of Mix networks 
Mix networks are introduced as anonymous communication 
protocols that can prevent the tracing of senders and 
recipients. A Mix network uses the mixer nodes to prevent 
malicious users from tracking messages. As we know, 
Opportunistic networks can build paths to transmit 
messages by using intermediate nodes. Mix networks can 
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use mixer nodes between intermediate nodes to construct 
the paths.  
Moreover, Mix networks have a high degree of flexibility, 
the same as Opportunistic networks. For this reason, we can 
consider Mix networks for different locations and 
environments. However, the term "Mix networks" is often 
referred to as non-traceable secure networks. Mix networks 
are very suitable for particular environments where 
information preservation is of great importance. For 
example, a government can use a Mix network to hold an 
important election in a country, where the disclosure of 
information or information tracking can lead to many 
problems. 
2.3.2 Defination of Mixer nodes 
Mixer nodes store all the received messages sent by the 
surrounding nodes in their buffers. As we see in figure 3, 
when the mixer node receives messages, they do not send 
messages immediately to other nodes. The mixer nodes 
change the order of all the messages before sending them to 
the next destination. These changes randomly occur in the 
mixer node buffer. We should know that the volume of Mix 
network traffic directly depends on the number of mixer 
nodes. The higher the number of the mixer nodes grows, the 
higher the amount of traffic becomes equally [15]. After the 
messages shuffled in a mixed column in a mixer node, they 
are sent to the nodes around the mixer nodes.  
All messages in Mix networks are encrypted by the public 
key for the mixer nodes. We can imagine this encryption in 
the form of Russian dolls with the message in the innermost 
layer. The message includes many layers and the mixer 
nodes by opening each layer, understand which node is the 
next destination. It is important to know that the mixer 
nodes open the layers by using their private keys. In the 
end, mixer nodes change the order of messages and send 
them to the next destination. 
2.3.3 Privacy in Mix network 
Mixer nodes can be vulnerable targets because they are 
attractive for malicious users. If malicious users penetrate 
in mixer nodes (for example, by injection of repackaged 
messages), they can damage the whole Mix network 
operation. In this section, we present several suggestions for 
improving privacy by introducing four dangerous threats to 
the privacy of Mixed Networks. We know that mixer nodes 
destroy links between senders and receivers. Therefore, 
malicious threats cannot identify users by analyzing the 
traffics of Mix networks. In case malicious users succeed in 
controlling some of the mixer nodes, they are not aware of 
previous message links, and they cannot identify the source 
and destination of the message. Mix networks can maintain 
anonymity in this way. The messages in the Mix networks 
contain unique information about the sender or receiver 
nodes. 
 
 
Figure 3. An example of Mix network. Adapted from [17] 
 
By this information, the nodes identify each other better, 
which is an advantage of Mix networks to improve sending 
and receiving in their next forward messeges. Due to this, 
the networks know their nodes better in the next update. 
There is a negative aspect to this feature because if there is 
more information about nodes, the malicious users know 
more about the nodes’ contacts, and they can analyze 
traffics of the Mix networks more easily and can break the 
anonymity and plan for more convenient attacks. To 
prevent this from happening, we need to limit the amount of 
the information we place in the Mix networks to only what 
is needed. 
Each message in each mixer node is encrypted — this 
encryption made by a public key. Before each proxy is 
encrypted, this layer indicates which node is the next or 
which one is the final destination [16]. If a network does 
these actions poorly or does repeated actions in the proxy, 
malicious users can make predictions and compromise the 
privacy of the network users by analyzing the Mix 
networks’ traffic and will find out about the connections 
between the network nodes. In such situations, malicious 
users monitor the arrival and departure of messages for a 
long time, or they test nodes that send messages from 
duplicate actions. In this way, they can predict the 
behaviour of nodes. The weakness in the transmitting 
process can also provide conditions for network penetration 
by malicious users. In this situation, malicious users can 
quickly create a template for prediction. They can use these 
weaknesses and, after penetration, break the privacy of the 
nodes and reach social graphs. To protect the networks, we 
must program proxies in a way that they do not allow 
duplicate actions or poor performance on encryption and 
decryption. 
 
3. THE PROPOSAL 
We plan to simulate a private and unlinkable exchange of 
messages by using a Public bulletin board and Mix network 
in Opportunistic networks. The goal is that the nodes can 
send and receive messages in an anonymous manner. In this 
simulation, the nodes can use paths which include some 
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mixer nodes, and these mixer nodes can protect paths from 
being traced. This proposal can make sure that the security 
of the client runs in the end-user. Also, we simulate a 
Public bulletin board in which nodes can store their 
messages in a protected form. Senders can store their 
messages to the Public bulletin board, and the receivers can 
receive their messages by the Public bulletin board [18].  
3.1 The Public bulletin board 
As sketched in figure 4, we assume a Public bulletin board 
with n cells. The client can access to the Public bulletin 
board by using the Mix network. All cells in a Public 
bulletin board can contain a set of value/tag pairs. All cells 
are known to have an index that they have. 
Users can operate two functions on a Public bulletin board. 
In the first function, the user can send an encrypted 
message with a preimage of the tag and an index to the 
Public bulletin board. A Public bulletin board can write 
encryption of a message in the value part of a cell. Also, a 
Public bulletin board can store preimage of the tag in the 
tag's part of a cell. The index of the cell in the Public 
bulletin board is chosen by the sender, and the Public 
bulletin board writes the message in the same index 
mentioned by the sender. It should be noted that the 
encrypted message must include a tag and an index for the 
next message from the sender. 
In the second function, a receiver sends the preimage of a 
corresponding tag and an index — the preimage of the 
corresponding tag can open the Public bulletin board cells. 
We know that any node which is to be read in a Public 
bulletin board must know the corresponding tag of value. If 
a Public bulletin board can open the cell by the preimage of 
the corresponding tag, the value of the cell will return to the 
receiver; otherwise, it returns null. It should also be noted 
that only the intended recipients can delete the value of the 
cell by using the preimage of the corresponding tag. 
We can adjust the size of a Public bulletin board in 
proportion to what a network needs. The size of the Public 
bulletin board can dynamically adjust with the network size 
so that we can reduce the amount of network activity and 
server activity. 
Public bulletin boards can be attractive targets for malicious 
users. If malicious users can control Public bulletin boards, 
they can learn about all vital network information. It should 
be noted that the Public bulletin board does not know about 
the identity of senders and recipients. In a sense, the 
proposal will increase the level of security and privacy for 
Public bulletin boards. 
3.2 Client protocols 
As figure 4 shows, node A and B want to send a message to 
each other. They have met and reached an agreement before 
exchanging the first message. We suppose that nodes A and 
B shared a secret symmetric key in that meeting. After 
sharing the secret symmetric key, node B can use this key 
for opening the message from node A. It should be noted 
that both node A and B create a fresh key for each message. 
Each fresh key is made by a key derivation function. After 
receiving each message to node B, both node A and B 
update the symmetric key by key derivation function and 
delete the old copy of the key. We know that there has been 
an agreement between nodes A and B for the first index of a 
cell on the Public bulletin board and that node A gives the 
preimage of the first message. 
As it was mentioned earlier, each cell has a number index in 
the Public bulletin board. Both node A and B can access a 
specific cell by the tag and index they share. Node B can 
read the value from a specific Public bulletin board cell 
because it recognizes the preimage of the corresponding tag 
and the first number index of that specific cell.  
Figure 4 is an example of our simulation. There is no direct 
connection between nodes A and B when they send a 
message to each other. Instead, there are some usual and 
mixer nodes which can be used to create a path between 
node A and B. 
Writing and reading from a Public bulletin board by nodes 
include two events during the process of simulation. During 
the first event, we assume that node A sends a message in a 
path that includes some mixer nodes and usual nodes. The 
message was sent along with a tag and index. The first 
mixer node receives the message and delivers it to the next 
mixer node, as long as the message and the rest of the 
content arrive in the Public bulletin board. Then the 
message will be stored in the same Public bulletin board 
cell according to the index number determined by node A. 
For security reasons, it is better not to save messages in 
continuous cells in the Public bulletin board. Therefore, 
node A chooses a random index for the next message that 
refers to a new place in the Public bulletin board. This 
process can continue to work as long as the Public bulletin 
board is not filled.  
In the second event, we suppose that the Public bulletin 
board receives a request message from node B. We know 
that nodes A and B have agreed about the first index and 
preimage of the corresponding tag. This message, along 
with the preimage of the corresponding tag and the first 
number index, will be read by the specific cell. The request 
message passes from a path with some mixer nodes, which 
makes it impossible to trace the path. After the request 
message arrives at the Public bulletin board, it checks the 
request message with the corresponding index and tag in 
the Public bulletin board cell. If the index of the tag was not 
empty, and the preimage of the corresponding tag can open 
the cell, the value of the cells returns to node B; otherwise, 
returns null. The Public bulletin board form the value of the 
cell as a new message and publish it in a path which 
includes some mixer nodes again. 
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Figure 4. An example of a Public bulletin board 
As we said earlier, a path with mixer nodes is protected 
from being traced. After the message passes along the path, 
it will arrive in node B along with the value. 
After the arrival of the message (with a value) to node B, 
node B can decrypt the value of the message by the secret 
symmetric key shared before between node A and B. The 
information about the next index and tag mentioned in the 
encrypted value that node B can decrypt it now and know it. 
Node B decrypts the value and recognizes the index and tag 
of the next cell for a new message. Therefore, node B 
knows where the next message in Public bulletin board 
cells can be found. Also, node B can open the next cell by 
the tag it receives from the encrypted message of the value. 
Despite all the advantages, this proposal cannot say that this 
Public bulletin board is safe from any attack.   
For example, we can consider a situation in which a 
malicious user sends many messages and fills all the cells in 
the Public bulletin board in his/her favour. A simple 
solution is that the Public bulletin board has registration for 
each node. It can prevent the Public bulletin board from 
attacks by a malicious node. By using this method, we can 
protect our public bulletin board form potential threats. 
Also, we suppose a value for each node, and the value 
decreases each time that a node stores a message in the 
Public bulletin board. Such actions could prevent these 
types of attacks from blocking the Public bulletin board. 
 
4. Experimentation  
4.1 Simulation environment 
This proposal uses the ONE simulator for simulation— the 
ONE simulator is a java based simulator which is used for 
research in delay tolerant networks [19]. The ONE 
simulator can define different nodes with different 
behaviours and engage them in different scenarios.  
The ONE simulator has some default functions which can 
be used to make, send, receive and route messages between 
nodes. In this simulator, we can create different scenarios 
by explaining different occurrences. We can also change 
the default functions of ONE simulator for specific routing 
protocols and design new protocols. We can change in the 
structure of messages and nodes too. 
The ONE simulator can display outputs of simulation in 
two ways: graphically and textual. Our proposal has not 
used any graphics outputs; we have used textual outputs. 
We can customize outputs of the ONE simulator according 
to our proposal. 
Also, the ONE simulator uses a function for making reports 
of simulation. The ONE simulator considers a Report file to 
gather all reports. These reports can provide enough 
information on how to work the simulation.  
4.2 Scenarios 
We define two scenarios in this proposal by using the ONE 
simulator. These two scenarios have some differences in 
speed movement of nodes and spatial dimensions of 
simulation. It should be noted that both scenarios have the 
same execution time. 
In the first scenario, we assume a park in the dimension of 
one kilometer square and that forty-one nodes exist in this 
park. Each of these nodes is a human that can slowly walk 
with the speed of one to two kilometers per hour in the park 
and each node moves in a random direction. The number 
zero node is a Public bulletin board, and the size of it is one 
hundred cells. Other nodes can be normal nodes or mixer 
nodes. The range of the node's transmission is twenty-five 
meter, and the speed of the transmission is one hundred 
megabytes per second. Each node can use two prefixes for 
sending a message to the Public bulletin board: one prefix 
to write in the Public bulletin board and the second one to 
read from it. Each message can use three mixer nodes at 
maximum to reach the Public bulletin board. 
In the second scenario, the Setting file is the same, except 
for the dimension of the park and the node's speed of 
movement. We assume a park as big as five hundred 
squares. Also, the node's speed of the movement is double 
time faster, and it is between two to three kilometres per 
hours. 
4.3 The ONE modification 
The ONE simulator contains various functions, each 
containing a set of different compiled java functions — 
each one designed for a specific purpose in the simulator. 
This proposal had the most changes in a series of java -
functions in Core and Routing functions. Also, we created a 
new function in the core file which we called "BB". The BB 
Database for 
public 
bulletins board 
A B 
Sender 
Receiver 
Normal node 
Mixer node 
Public bulletins board node 
Network transmission 
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function used to create a Public bulletin board. We also 
needed to make changes to the Routing functions so that we 
could define a protocol between senders and receivers with 
a public bulletins board. Also, this simulation considers 
Mix network function, which can change each node to 
become a mixer node. This section only discusses changes 
in the functions and the creation of BB java function. 
We should know that after all changes on the ONE 
simulator (which will be explained), we can compile all the 
functions to record the changes. After running the simulator 
on our desired setting on Setting files according to our 
proposal, the ONE simulator can execute the simulation. 
Also, in the terminal, we can see outputs of each step of 
sending, receiving, and storing messages from the Public 
bulletin board. After the occurrence of each step, the status 
of the Public bulletin board will be shown in the terminal.  
4.3.1 Public bulletin board function 
In the first step, we write a java function for creating a 
Public bulletin board structure. We create this function in 
core functions. 
The structure of the Public bulletin board contains two 
arrays, one array for storing the preimage of tags and 
another for storing values. Also, each cell of arrays has a 
number index by which we can access the cell. 
The Public bulletin board function has two main methods. 
One of the methods is the WRITE method, which is used to 
write the value of messages and the preimage of tags from 
senders, and another one is the READ method to return 
values from a Public bulletin board to receivers. 
The WRITE method is the first method that we considered 
in the java Public bulletin board function (BB). At first, 
when a message arrives in the Public bulletin board, BB 
function checks the message's prefix. If the message's prefix 
is equal to the WRITE prefix, the WRITE method becomes 
active. Then, the WRITE method starts to store the message 
in the Public bulletin board arrays. As we know, a message 
includes a value, the preimage of tag and an id. The 
message's id refers to the numbered cell of arrays. The 
WRITE method receives the message's value and stores it 
in the value array. The cell's number of the array is equal to 
the message's id. The WRITE method does the same with 
the preimage of the message's tag and stores it in tags array. 
The READ method is the second method we considered in 
the java Public bulletin board function (BB). After checking 
the prefix message by the Public bulletin board function, if 
the message's prefix is equal to the READ prefix, the 
READ method becomes active. It should be noted that a 
message to get value from the Public bulletin board needs 
an id and a corresponding tag. The READ method checks 
the cell's number of the tags array according to the 
message's id. The READ method checks the value array 
with the same number of id to see if the cell's tag is equal to 
the corresponding message's tag. Then the READ method 
returns the value in the form of a new message. -The READ 
method sends the new message in a path that including 
mixer nodes to reach the leading destination by using 
routing function. 
4.3.2 The DTNHost function 
In the ONE simulator, all nodes are created by DTNHOST 
function. The structure of a node created by the DTNHOST 
function consists of the name, location, type of movement, 
range of transmission, speed of transition, etc. Even we can 
by call BB function in a host structure and use a Public 
bulletin board structure in it. Also, we add three values, 
including a secret key, an agreed-id and an agreed-tag in 
DTNHOST function. It should be noted that we wrote these 
three functions to generate the secret key, the agreed-id and 
the agreed-tag that it takes amount randomly for each one. 
Also, we write methods to generate their value. 
4.3.3 The SIM Scenario function 
Scenario function can create a scenario that is supposed to 
happen according to Setting files. We have modified the 
Scenario function. In a part of this function that takes the 
number of the host in simulation from the Setting function, 
we can have constructed the first node as the Public bulletin 
board to create nodes in the simulation when it uses 
DTNHOST function. 
4.3.4 The Message function 
The Message function is used for creating message 
structures in the ONE simulator. The message structure has 
values including sender hosts, receiver hosts, the id of the 
message, the size of the message, etc. We add some values 
for carrying the agreed-id, the agreed-tag and the encrypted 
value. Also, we have created a method that works 
automatically when a message is generated. This method 
simulates the agreement between sender hosts and receiver 
hosts. When a message is created automatically, the value 
of the secret key, the agreed-tag and the agreed-id between 
a sender host and a receiver host becomes equal. Also, the 
id and tag in the message structure become equal with the 
agreed-id and the agreed-tag values from the sender. 
4.3.5 The Mix network function 
We create a java function in the routing functions named 
Mix network function which generates the mixer nodes. As 
mentioned in the previous section, using mixer nodes in the 
simulation can create an untraceable message which has 
been one of the goals of the present proposal. At each mixer 
node, messages become mixed without any change to their 
context. 
4.3.6 The Message routing function 
The message routing function introduces a protocol to route 
a message from senders to receivers. To do so, we should 
have some changes on message routing function to adapt 
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simulation with the Public bulletin board. Firstly, in 
Message routing function, we check the message 
destination to make sure whether or not it exists in the 
Public bulletin board. If the destination exists in the Public 
bulletin board, we activate the Public bulletin board 
function to check the message. Also, as we know, a Public 
bulletin board uses Message routing function to send new 
messages it generates to return the values. After generating 
a new message by the Public bulletin board, we change the 
address of the host who wants to receive a message of the 
Public bulletin board with zero node address. Then we add 
the new message in the list of the message for routing in 
simulation. New messages will use mixer nodes to reach the 
leading destination. Also, after the routing of all new 
messages, we can access the information about all new 
messages in reports files. 
4.4 Results 
4.4.1 Metrics to be studied 
We review the result of the simulation by considering three 
metrics that include Total packet delivery ratio, Total 
packet latency average and Total packet latency median. 
The Total packet delivery ratio is the ratio of the total 
packets successfully sent to the Public bulletin board. We 
calculate the Total packet delivery ratio by the sum of the 
ratio delivery of all packets that arrive at the Public bulletin 
board (all packets that use one, two, or three mixers or do 
not use any mixers). Then, we divided the total delivery 
ratio by four. We show the Total packet delivery ratio in 
Figure 5 and Figure 8 for each scenario by two columns in 
blue and red. The blue column refers to nodes which store 
messages in the Public bulletin board, and the red column 
refers to the nodes which receive messages from the Public 
bulletin board. 
The total packet latency average refers to the total delay of 
packets that arrive at the Public bulletin board. We calculate 
the total packet latency average by the sum of the latency of 
all packets that arrive at the Public bulletin board, packets 
that use one, two, or three mixers or do not use any mixers. 
Also, in Figure 6 and Figure 9, we consider two columns 
with red and blue colours.  
The total packet latency median refers to the total delay of 
packets to arrive at the Public bulletin board for both 
methods. We calculate Total packet latency median by the 
sum of the median of all packets that arrive at Public 
bulletin board, all packets that use one mixer or two mixers 
or three mixers or do not use any mixer. Also, in Figure 7 
and Figure 10, we consider two columns with different 
colours as previous figures. 
4.4.2 Result 
For the first scenario, we provided three charts. Figure 5 
refers to the Total packet delivery ratio. In both methods 
(READ with the red column, WRITE with the blue 
column), the results of the Total packet delivery ratio have 
an acceptable ratio. Therefore, we can understand that if a 
node sends a message for storing in the Public bulletin 
board, this message reaches the destination with a high rate. 
Also, in Figure 6 and Figure 7, we can see the Total packet 
latency average and the Total packet latency median for the 
total number of messages for each method. Unfortunately, 
if we look at these figures, we notice that the simulation has 
not worked very well in terms of network latency and 
median. A message should stay quite a few minutes in 
intermediate nodes to reach the destination, which is a long 
time for the delivery of a packet, as we know. If our Setting 
file includes the slow movement of the nodes and the size 
of the simulated environment, we can justify these results. 
In general, these results are not acceptable.  
As we said, we had some changes in the Setting file for the 
second scenario. In the following next three charts, we 
obtained results by doubling the speed of node movement 
and half of the simulation park dimension but with the same 
execution time. Figure 8 shows the Total packet delivery 
ratio for the second scenario. At first, the rate for the second 
scenario is very acceptable as the first scenario. It can be a 
reasonable rate for simulation to deliver each message. 
Figure 9 and Figure 10 show the Total packet latency 
average and the Total packet latency median. An important 
point in Figure 9 and Figure 10 is the Mix network 
condition (because of the messages stored in the mixer 
nodes many times), which makes the latency average, and 
latency median acceptable. In general, these results are 
good results for the second scenario. 
4.4.3 Conclusions on the results 
By considering all the charts, we can compare two 
scenarios. Based on the Total packet delivery ratio of both 
scenarios, we can see that our simulation has a high 
performance in terms of delivery rates. In general, we can 
conclude that the simulation has a good Total packet 
delivery ratio. 
As we have seen in the first scenario, the latency time rate 
was very high; it is not an acceptable rate for our 
simulation. Moreover, with the changes we made in the 
second scenario, we achieved acceptable results in terms of 
network latency and median. We know that we had a small 
modification in the second scenario, but we can see a 
massive difference between the charts. Thus, the simulation 
performance is related directly to the node’s speed of 
movement and the size of the simulation environment. 
By doubling the speed of the nodes, we reduce the delay of 
the message several times. We can say that the simulation 
in the second scenario has a good result by considering the 
Total packet latency average and the Total packet latency 
median. If we look at our simulation performance by 
considering all the charts, it can be concluded that our  
11 
 
 
 Figure 5. Total delivery probability ratio for scenario 1  
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Figure 7. Total latency median for scenario 1  
 
 
 
 
Figure 8. Total delivery probability ratio for scenario 2 
 
 
 
Figure 9. Total latency average for scenario 2 
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simulation can work  well with a central Public bulletin 
board for environments where nodes have a faster speed of 
movement. Given the overall results, it can be concluded 
that the simulation has a reasonably good performance. 
 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
As we discussed in the document, we intended to simulate a 
private and unlinkable exchange of messages by using a 
Public bulletin board and Mix networks in opportunistic 
networks. We used the Mix network, where the nodes could 
send their messages through intermediate nodes 
anonymously. By considering the materials from the related 
work section, we provided a protocol in which nodes could 
send their packets to the public bulletin in a secure 
environment. Also, we considered two different scenarios, 
and we analyzed and compared them. 
If we want to draw a general conclusion about the results of 
the simulation, we can say that our simulation has a 
satisfactory performance. Nodes can operate and use the 
benefits of the public bulletins board in our simulation. 
Also, the nodes can send their packets in anonymity by 
using Mix network. At all stages, we succeeded in 
preserving the anonymity of the nodes. In general, we can 
say that this proposal was able to achieve overall goals at an 
acceptable level. 
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